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Record

**OPPORTUNITIES, PROBLEMS, AND ISSUES IN OUR  
RELATIONS WITH THE HILL****1) Timeliness of responses:**

This is the major Hill complaint. We in OLL continue negotiations with DO over the role of EPS. We hope, at a minimum, to be able to answer factual questions more quickly. Accuracy and completeness of DO responses also must be improved. Please see the separate attachment for further details on delays in serving Congressional queries and some thoughts for improving our record. Also attached, please find the record we have kept on tasking.

**2) The Stability and Substance of OLL/Liaison in dealing with Congress**

OLL is seen as political and unstable--the former because changes in staffing and personnel are often perceived as generally correlative to new top managers, most especially the DCI and the DDO. I've also heard our office characterized as a "Bolivia," presumably not because of what we're smoking up here, but as a reflection of the all too frequent coups, changes, and reorganizations. While rolling stones gather no moss, expertise and trusted relationships do not come easily for OLL short-timers either. It is not helpful to hear from some of our own colleagues that the nature of the job on a rotational to OLL is such that good people from the DO will plainly have the good sense to steer away from such assignments. I am pleased to report that neither John Stein nor the incumbent DDO seem to feel that way, and, modesty aside, good people from DO have happily accepted their tours here. In any event, all this leaves our Congressional contacts somewhat disoriented as to the personnel and policies issuing from OLL. Those among them who would also make good case officers know how to play and manipulate OLL to their advantage--alternating their approaches and demands to meet the need. Illustrative of that is one memorable Saturday when Peter Sullivan mobilized the DDCI, Clair George, Chuck Briggs, [redacted] Dewey Clarridge and me--each calling the other for updates and information as Peter orchestrated the day. In sum: needed is the stability and continuity of OLL personnel. If the DO officers on rotational have the complete trust of the DDO and in fact can act for the DDO within OLL, they, most especially, should

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serve a full term. The same should be true for the senior officers designated by the other Directorates. Failing either criterion, the Legislative Division could be optimally well run without a Division Chief and with two GS-12 to 14's as Senate/House Branch Chiefs. These are not my own subjective perceptions. They subsume the small subtleties and nuances all too evident to the alert Congressional staffer, who is also well aware that it's taking longer and longer to get answers out of OLL and that, in part, the delays result from action and responsibility shifting away from OLL. While we still, hopefully, retain respect and good will for OLL among most of our contacts on the Hill, we cannot allow legitimate OLL functions to deteriorate to a category of "fetch and carry," and "messenger boy." When that happens, the Liaison Division, at least, will have lost the capability for making a difference in what we do and how we do it in our relations with the Congress. We have a chance now to make OLL/Liaison a more meaningful instrument in projecting and protecting Agency interest.

### 3) MON Procedures:

The response to Capitol Hill has been somewhat slow in the past, but an effort is being made to improve our procedures once an MON has been approved by the President. One thing we can do is to have the DO Area Division prepare the notification letter for the Committee at the same time it drafts the MON for the DCI. If this is done, the notification letter will receive the same clearance process as the MON which is going to the Director. Once the MON is signed, OLL can put the notification letter in final format and have it to the Committees within the required two working days. If there is any problem in getting the letter released by the Director, we can call the Committees within the 48-hour period and notify them that an MON is on the way, which will certainly satisfy their requirements. I've also asked the Legislative Division to set up a briefing for our side on any options and alternatives under Title V, Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1945.

### 4) HPSCI Transcripts:

We need to have permission to enter these in RSM. This lack greatly delays our responses to Committees and DCI inquiries on matters of record. I'll take this up personally with Tom L. and Mike O. (Please see attached MFR on my talk with O'Neil.)

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**SECRET**5) Clearance of Staffers:a) Compartmented clearances--within SSCI

Not all staffers are cleared for covert action briefings. In some instances Staff Directors only get briefed, and occasionally Members only get briefed. This causes hard feelings among the staffers. It is essentially a Committee problem, however. We can improve atmospherics, I think, by providing the Staff Director with a memo citing the fact that such an exclusive briefing took place, without going into specific subjects or money matters involved in the MON.

b) Denial of SCI clearances to personal staffs.

Despite occasional protests from Members, this prohibition should be maintained. It has saved us from disaster (as in the case of notorious problem cases when we have been able to deny them briefings and access to documents and hearings because they are on personal staffs and thus do not hold SCI clearances.) Reversing this prohibition would be an invitation to all the personal staff loonies to demand SCI clearances and greatly increase the circulation of sensitive information.

6) Obligations owed the Agency by SSCI/HPSCI:

Neither Oversight Committee is very vigorously--if at all--undertaking its duties to act as a buffer and filter in responding for the Agency where attacks or simply questions are directed at us from other staffs and Committees on the Hill. I believe we should make a very strong effort to persuade both to fulfill these responsibilities. But, if we don't bring this up--they won't.

7) Re SSCI and SAC:

- a) The "every man for himself" attitude prevalent among SSCI designees causes them to make frequent, individual queries of OLL. No Staff Director imprimature is on these bothersome initiatives, and he seems not to care or to wish to change the situation. We should move for the Staff Director to assume a more positive role over his staff in this regard.

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- b) The SAC Defense Subcommittee displays unwillingness (particularly staffers Dwyer and Sherman) to interact substantively with the SSCI staffers. (Keith Hall is an occasional exception.) We doubt that any reversal is possible but considerable time and effort could be saved by OLL and the Agency were SAC willing to get at least some of its intelligence support from SSCI.

8) Other Possible Substantive issues:

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b) Arms Control.

This will remain a contentious issue because it involves a number of people on the far right who are opposed to any arms control and on the far left who want a nuclear freeze. The DI monitors compliance issues, and it inevitably will be drawn into the emotional and partisan debate during the next session.

c) Budgetary Considerations.

Retirement; possible "freezes" of one kind or another; pay cut.

d) Recovery of the FY 1978-FY 1982 Yearly Supplemental.

Sensitive Annexes to our Congressional Budget Submission covering our covert action activities in considerable detail. These are provided to our two Oversight Committees and Appropriations Committees (HAC/SAC). (See attached MFR based on my talk with O'Neil on this.)

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